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ABSTRACT 
Higher education is increasingly a marketised service sharing many 
characteristics with other professional services such as legal, medical or 
financial services. With marketization comes competition, and the need for 
HEIs to develop and maintain attractive undergraduate programmes to 
attract and retain strong faculty and fee-paying students. Here, we consider 
the drivers of programme innovation – the introduction of new programmes 
– and the withdrawal of existing programmes in UK universities. Using 
panel data for all UK universities provided by UCAS we identify significant 
resource, internationalisation and business engagement effects. Financial 
stringency encourages both programme innovation and withdrawal. More 
extensive international market engagement and research collaboration with 
business have similar effects increasing programme innovation. The results 
have both strategic and systemic implications. 
Keywords: Higher education; Under-graduate: Innovation; Globalisation; 
Business engagement  
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INTRODUCTION 
Internationally higher education ‘is moving from being a public good, 
funded through governments, to a private good where more of the cost is 
put on students and families’ (Kandiko and Blackmore 2010, p. 29). This 
trend positions undergraduate higher education as a ‘marketable service’ 
sharing many characteristics with other professional services such as legal, 
medical or financial services - i.e. their intangible nature, inseparability, and 
extensive inter-activity between client and provider (Miozzo and Soete 
2001). With this marketization comes competition, and the need for HEIs to 
develop and maintain attractive programme portfolios which can help to 
attract and retain strong faculty and fee-paying students. This requires 
programme innovation – the development and implementation of new 
programmes – and potentially the withdrawal of programmes which are 
out-dated, unattractive or unviable. To date studies of programme 
innovation have been case-based, focussing on the formulation of 
organisational strategy in HEIs and the delivery of programme change 
(Brennan et al. 2014; Kandiko and Blackmore 2010)1. Here, we provide an 
alternative, quantitative, perspective identifying the drivers of programme 
innovation and withdrawal across the UK university sector. 
Our starting point is a recognition of the complex stakeholder pressures 
and organisational objectives of universities (Jarzabkowski 2005), and the 
inherently interactive and social nature of the innovation process in which 
outcomes depend on the capabilities of those contributing to the process, 
and the level and openness of interaction between actors (de Medeiros, 
Ribeiro, and Cortimiglia 2014; Harrison and Leitch 2010). As such, 
systemic perspectives provide a useful analytical framework in both the 
commercial (de Zubielqui et al. 2015; Kauffeld-Monz and Fritsch 2013; 
Trippl 2011) and higher education contexts (Brennan et al. 2014) of 
examining innovation.  Brennan  et al. (2014, p. 37), for example, define a 
                                               
1  As Perkmann et al. (2013, p. 431) suggest the result has been that ‘extant 
analyses have neglected to consider [innovations’] impact on educational output, 
such as time devoted to teaching, curriculum and programmes development, and 
teaching quality’. 
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higher education innovation system as ‘a sub-set of an [economy wide] 
innovation system concentrated particularly in higher education institutions 
(universities and associated research institutes, vocational training 
institutions, master’s colleges, etc.), which are in close connection with 
other institutional spheres, such as industry, government and non-
government agencies, and the society at large’. Here, we therefore 
consider three main drivers of undergraduate programme innovation and 
withdrawal: the financial performance of each HEI, engagement with 
international markets and the extent of business engagement. 
Our programme analysis is based on data provided by the Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), and draws on concepts from the 
study of innovation in commercial organisations. We make three main 
contributions. First, we develop a range of new quantitative indicators of 
programme innovation and withdrawal in HEIs and use these metrics to 
profile the main trends in UK HEIs’ programme innovation and withdrawal 
over the last decade. Second, we use panel data econometric techniques 
to examine the impact of financial performance, international engagement 
and business engagement on programme innovation and withdrawal 
across the UK higher education sector. Each turns out to play a significant 
role in shaping some aspects of HEI’s undergraduate programme portfolio. 
Finally, we consider separately levels of programme innovation and 
withdrawal in the priority STEM and non-STEM programmes. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines our 
conceptual framework and hypotheses focussing on the role of resources, 
internationalisation and business engagement on programme innovation 
and withdrawal. Section 3 describes our data which covers the period 
2005-2013 and draws on information provided by UCAS and the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA). Section 4 reports our empirical 
analysis and Section 5 considers some of the strategic and systemic 
implications of the findings. 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Definitions of innovation vary, but generally in the context of ‘for profit’ 
enterprises  the commercialisation of new knowledge or technology to 
generate increased sales or value for consumers or related stakeholders is 
stressed. The US Advisory Committee on Measuring Innovation, for 
example, defines innovation as: ‘The design, invention, development 
and/or implementation of new or altered products, services, processes, 
systems, organisational structures or business models for the purpose of 
creating new value for customers and financial returns for the firm’ 
(Advisory Committee on Measuring Innovation in the 21st Century 
Economy 2008, p. i). Our focus here is on the introduction of new 
programmes at an undergraduate level which may be attractive – offer 
value – to students, and which may generate financial returns or strategic 
or reputational benefits for universities (Schatzel, Calantone, and Droge 
2001). We are also concerned here with the withdrawal or cancellation of 
programmes, a subject which has received considerably less attention in 
the management literature outside pharmaceuticals (Bunniran et al. 2009).   
Both programme innovation and withdrawal are inherantly social and inter-
active processes, in which outcomes are dependent on the pressures on 
the actors involved in the process, the capabilities of those contributing to 
the process, and their level and openness of interaction (de Medeiros, 
Ribeiro, and Cortimiglia 2014; Harrison and Leitch 2010).  As a result, little 
commonality emerges in innovation processes with heads of department in 
leading universities adopting varied top-down and bottom-up mechanisms 
to manage change (Gibbs et al. 2008). As Jarzabkowski (2005) outlines, 
‘Curriculum change is often a contentious and political endeavour’ (p.26) as 
a result of a complex stakeholder landscape (Jarzabkowski 2005) and a 
frequent lack of agreement about objectives between academic and 
administrative staff (McInnis 1998). Systemic perspectives which can 
embody this diverse group of success factors for innovation processes 
have proved valuable in both the commercial (de Zubielqui et al. 2015; 
Kauffeld-Monz and Fritsch 2013; Trippl 2011) and higher education 
contexts. The higher education system is an integral part of a wider 
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economy-wide innovation system comprising commercial, social and 
political actors and institutional contexts (Brennan et al. 2014). 
Beyond actors and institutional characteristics, innovation systems also 
comprise ‘functions’ which, in the case of higher education, Brennan et al. 
(2014) suggest can be identified as education, research and third mission 
activities. Programme innovation and withdrawal are central to the 
education function of the higher education innovation system, and may be 
driven either by endogenous processes, factors outside the immediate 
innovation system, or a complex combination both (Kandiko and Blackmore 
2010).  
At a systemic level, drivers of innovation in higher education may include 
economic crises as witnessed during the 2008 global economic recession, 
budget increases or cuts to the funding structure of higher education etc.  
In recent years, many countries have replaced trust-based funding regimes 
where universities automatically received a grant allocation from 
government with little account of their output and outcomes, to 
performance-based or competitive funding mechanisms (Geuna and 
Martin, 2001; Conraths and Smidt, 2005; Orr et al 2007; Sorlin, 2007). The 
rationale for this being that this leads to more efficient allocation of public 
resources and creates diversity in the university sector (Sorlin, 2007).  
In the UK, the adoption of a performance-based funding regime was 
coupled in the 1990s with a greater emphasis on the inter-relatedness of 
research and economic benefit and the realisation that differentiation 
existed in the university sector (HM Treasury 2007). This ‘diversity of 
excellence’ in the research base was described as distinguishing between 
‘research universities focusing on curiosity-driven research, teaching and 
knowledge transfer, and business-facing universities focusing on the 
equally important economic mission of professional teaching, user-driven 
research and problem-solving with local and regional companies’ (HM 
Treasury 2007, p.5). In other words, research quality was a key 
differentiating feature of heterogeneity in knowledge transfer strategies and 
activities in the university sector. In terms of programmes being offered by 
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universities, government pressure to increase the economic benefit of 
universities was evidenced in proposals to reduce support for arts-based 
degree programmes (Kandiko and Blackmore 2010).  
Aligned to changes in government funding priorities, at an organisational 
level, factors such as the autonomy of a university can be a key 
determinant of innovative activity (Brennan et al. 2014). Financial 
stringency may be used by senior managers in universities as a pretext for 
driving programme change: ‘Finance and marketing often provide the 
motivation for change but may be part of an agenda that is not made 
explicit, and is sometimes perceived to be hidden’ (Kandiko and Blackmore 
2010, p.28). We therefore suggest that (Figure 1):  
Hypothesis 1a: Stronger HEI financial performance will be 
associated with reduced programme innovation rates; 
Hypothesis 1b: Stronger HEI financial performance will be 
associated with reduced programme withdrawal rates.  
Sorlin (2007) argues that performance-based funding acts as an important 
policy instrument in the allocation of resources to universities. Specifically, 
through the use of metrics to measure deliverables and outputs, it allows 
governments to invest more efficiently in R&D while also creating diversity 
in the university sector. In the UK, a meritocratic funding system for higher 
education, tends to reward successful research universities creating 
differentiation in the university sector as the ‘existing research elite is 
further reinforced and the status quo is maintained’ (Guena and Martin 
2001, 28) through vertical differentiation with the potential for functional 
specialization (Sorlin 2007). In other words, the effects of financial 
performance on innovation activity will be greater where teaching is a 
higher proportion of total university income.  This leads to our second 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The more important teaching income is in the 
revenue mix of a university, the stronger the financial performance 
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effect on innovation and withdrawal rates. 
Brennan et al. (2014) argue too that one of the key external forces on 
higher education innovation has been pressures from the globalisation of 
competition for students and faculty and the changing supply of, and 
demand for, higher education 2 . For example, following McMahon et 
al.(1992) analyses of the study choices of international students have 
emphasised quality and reputational factors as the primary drivers of 
institutional choice. Gatfield and Chen (2006), for example, analysed the 
preferences of 518 Taiwanese students and suggested that UK universities 
should ‘continue to emphasise and promote the high quality and reputation 
of [their] educational services’ (2006, p.90)3. Similarly, Maringe and Carter 
(2007, p. 460) investigated the preferences of African students studying in 
the UK and argued that ‘a good understanding of students’ decision-
making processes creates a sound basis for developing curriculum 
programmes that address the real rather than the perceived needs of this 
group of scholars’. They explored the preferences of 28 African students 
studying in England, and while the quality of UK higher education 
qualifications was the primary ‘pull’ factor at the country level, the primary 
institutional pull factor was programme availability (Mariange and Carter, 
2007, Figure 1, p. 471).  In the UK, based on a sample of 160 
predominantly post-graduate students Wilkins et al. (2011) also found that 
the factors most often identified as being “very important” in determining 
their decision to study in the UK were quality of education, high 
international league table rankings, employment prospects and 
opportunities to improve English language skills. Students’ choice of 
institution then depended most strongly on the reputation of a university, 
                                               
2 In terms of programme innovation specifically we might also add the potential 
impact of initiatives such as the European Bologna Process although the impact of 
this remains ‘patchy’ across UK universities. See, for example, ‘UK must wake up 
to Bologna benefits, Times Higher Education Supplement, April 6, 2007. 
3 Some other issues are perhaps more difficult to overcome, viz ‘according to the 
results from in-depth interviews, some Taiwanese people have the stereotype of 
the UK that it has a cloudy, snowy and cold winter, not an exciting place to live and 
with some personal safety problems’ (Gatfield and Chen, 2006, p. 90). 
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the quality of programme, rankings, programme content, and the reputation 
of faculty.  
In terms of the domestic environment for higher education, the removal of 
the cap on domestic undergraduate student numbers announced in the UK 
Autumn Statement in 2013 removed one major constraint on competition, a 
trend which may be exacerbated if – as some have anticipated – the cap 
on tuition fees is removed in future4. Interestingly, however, recent studies 
have suggested that home students’ institutional choices are only weakly 
linked to the level of tuition fees (Burge et al. 2014), or as one study put it, 
there is little evidence that ‘student mobility is driven by economic 
rationality’ (Wakeling and Jefferies 2013, p.510). Instead, what seems to 
dominate students’ choices are quality – as reflected in student satisfaction 
surveys - and employability. In Australia, Maazzarol et al. (2001), for 
example, surveyed 828 domestic students and found that future 
employment prospects were the primary factor governing institutional 
choice followed by a range of factors linked to ‘resources and 
programmes’.  
This suggests that the incentives for effective programme innovation are 
strong particularly where ‘national systems have become heavily 
dependent on the recruitment of overseas students paying high fees in 
order to sustain their internationally-focussed layer of universities’ (Kandiko 
and Blackmore 2010, p.26). We therefore suggest that (Figure1):  
Hypothesis 3a: Greater engagement with international markets will 
be associated with increased innovation rates; 
Hypothesis 3b: Greater engagement with international markets will 
be associated with increased withdrawal rates; 
                                               
4 Scott, P (2014) ‘End to cap on university student numbers clears path for private 
equity’, The Guardian, 4th March 2014. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/mar/04/george-osborne-fee-cap-
policy-private-equity. Accessed 21st May 2015.  
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Alongside the marketization of UK universities’ teaching activities in recent 
years there has also been a considerable development of third mission 
activities related primarily to business engagement (Muscio, Quaglione, 
and Vallanti 2015). These linkages create the potential for knowledge co-
creation and the more effective tailoring of university programmes to meet 
industry needs, hence: as Kandiko and Blackmore (2010, p.27) found, ‘In 
general, we found institutions that made successful change worked with 
external agencies to gather opinions about curricula and graduate 
attributes, feeding the ideas into the processes of change’. More recently 
Plewa et al. (2015) investigated the role of five different forms of university-
business interaction on the design and delivery of university programmes 
across a range of countries and concluded that ‘the instruments examined 
in this study emerge as encouraging business to collaborate with HEIs in 
the context of curriculum design and development, aimed at co-creating 
value with the business community’ (Plewa et al., 2015, p. 46).  Evidence 
on this relationship is limited (Plewa et al, 2015) however based on these 
findings we suggest that (Figure 1): 
Hypothesis 4a: Greater engagement with business will be 
associated with increased innovation rates; 
Hypothesis 4b: Greater engagement with business will be 
associated with increased withdrawal rates; 
DATA AND METHODS 
Our empirical analysis relates to the 2005 to 2013 period and is based on 
data compiled from three main sources: programme data for each 
individual degree programme was provided by UCAS; data on business 
interaction by each HEI is taken from the HE-BCI survey; and, data on 
institutions’ financial performance and market positioning was derived from 
the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) HEIDI database. Each is 
described in turn. 
Programme data: This was provided on a year-by-year basis for all 
individual programmes offered through the UCAS system from 2005 to 
  
 
13 
2013. For each programme we were provided with a unique identifier, 
programme title, the number of places accepted and the breakdown of 
places accepted by UK, EU and non-EU applicants5. This data was collated 
into a time series for each programme providing an indication of whether 
programmes were in place for the whole of the 2005 to 2013 period or 
whether they were newly introduced or withdrawn in each year during this 
period6. Programme innovation we then define as the introduction of a new 
programme by an HEI7. Programme withdrawal is when a programme is 
dropped from the range of programmes provided by an individual HEI.   
These individual time series for each programme were then aggregated to 
provide time series for each institution. While the absolute number of 
programme innovations and withdrawals may be interesting in its own right 
we focus here on the innovation and withdrawal rates, both of which 
provide an indication of the dynamism of the portfolio of programmes 
offered by an institution normalised for institution size.  If Iit is the number of 
programme innovations made by institution i in period t, W it the number of 
programme withdrawals and Pit the total number of programmes on offer by 
institution I, then the innovation and withdrawal rate are defined as: 
𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕 =  
𝑰𝒊𝒕𝒙 𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏
 
                                               
5 UCAS provides access to undergraduate programmes provided by both Higher 
Education and some Further Education providers. The Higher Education Statistics 
Agency identifies 164 Higher Education Providers in the UK (Source: 
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/component/heicontacts. Accessed: 10 April 2015) of which 
fifteen do not accept applications through UCAS either because they are specialist 
institutions and handle their own admissions (e.g. the Royal Northern College of 
Music, Open University) or because they are postgraduate only institutions (e.g. 
Cranfield, London Business School). Our analysis therefore covers 149 or 90.8 per 
cent of higher education providers in the UK, i.e. those engaged in the provision of 
undergraduate programmes and who accept applications through UCAS. In terms 
of the programmes on offer through UCAS this group of HE providers accounted 
for 90.1 per cent of all programmes on offer in 2013 (2006, 94.1 per cent) with the 
remainder being offered primarily by further education providers. 
6 In a limited number of cases programmes accepted no applicants in year t but did 
have acceptances in years t-1 and t+1. In this situation the programme was said to 
be ‘in place’ throughout the t-1 to t+1 period.  
7  A programme may be new-to-the-institution, having previously been provided 
elsewhere, or new-to-the-market, the first time a programme is introduced across 
the HEI sector. 
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𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒍  𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕 =  
𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒙 𝟏𝟎𝟎
𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏
 
On average over the 2005 to 2013 period HEIs’ average innovation rate 
averaged 18.8 per cent while the withdrawal rate was marginally higher at 
20.2 per cent (Table 1).  
Within HEIs’ programme portfolios we make two other distinctions. First, we 
distinguish between the innovation and withdrawal of STEM and non-
STEM programmes. Here, we use the JACs 3 programme coding to 
allocate programmes to either the STEM or non-STEM categories8. On 
average around 35.4 per cent of programmes were in STEM subjects 
(Table 1). Second, we distinguish between single subject programmes, 
those involving joint subjects and those which offer a major-minor 
combination. Single subject programmes include traditional disciplinary 
degrees (e.g. Zoology, Veterinary Science) but also more contemporary 
additions such as Visual Communications, Web Technologies and Viking 
Studies 9 . Joint subject programmes are those where two subjects are 
named, where each one might be a single subject programme in its own 
right, and where no prioritisation is implied in the programme name. 
Examples would be: Sport and Physical Education, Business and 
Management, Theology and Religious Studies. Finally, major-minor 
programmes would be those where again each element of the degree 
might be a single programme in its own right but where there is clearly a 
primary discipline. Examples here would be: Zoology with Animal Ecology, 
Theatre Studies with English Literature or Politics with History. Over the 
2005 to 2013 period single subject courses accounted for around 53.5 per 
cent of all undergraduate programmes on offer, 11.8 per cent were 
major/minor combinations and the remainder joint programmes (Table 1).  
                                               
8 Where degrees are joint or major/minor we base the allocation on the first named 
subject. So biology and French would be STEM while French and Biology would 
be categorised as non-STEM. 
9 One limitation of this approach – and one which it is hard to overcome with our 
data – is the extent to which new programmes are inter-disciplinary focussing on 
specific topic areas. European Studies, for example, is generally an inherently 
inter-disciplinary degree programme but would be categorised in our data as a 
single-subject programme.  
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Financial performance data: To reflect the financial viability of the HEI 
and the importance of teaching income as a source of revenue we 
extracted three indicators from the Key Financial Indicators section of the 
Higher Education Information Database for Institutions (HEIDI) database 
run by the Higher Education Statistics Agency. These are: the percentage 
ratio of tuition fees & education contracts to total income (%); the 
percentage ratio of historical surplus/(deficit) for the year after taxation to 
total income (%); and the ratio of current assets to liabilities.  
External market engagement: We measure HEIs’ engagement with 
international markets using the percentage of non-EU students accepting 
places in each year. This is derived from the UCAS data. 
Business engagement: This is measured using two indicators derived 
from the Higher Education – Business and Community Interaction Survey 
(HE-BCI) database which is the main source of information on knowledge 
exchange activities in UK universities. Collected by HESA this is an annual 
and mandatory survey of all UK Universities and therefore provides a 
comprehensive profile of engagement activities 10 . The survey provides 
information on specific interactions with external partners, such as contract 
and collaborative research, consultancy, continuing professional 
development and intellectual property. We derive two measures from the 
HE-BCI survey designed to reflect the breadth of university-business 
interaction. In each case measures from the HE-BCI survey are normalised 
by the number of academic staff in the institution. The two measures are: 
income from research contracts with business per academic staff employee 
and income from facilities and equipment contracts per academic staff 
employee.  
                                               
10  
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_studrec&Itemid=232&mnl=14032  
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Control variables: Three groups of time-variant control variables are 
included in the estimation. First, it is often argued that organisations with 
more diverse staff composition may be more likely to innovate (Konnola, 
Brummer, and Salo 2007; Ostergaard, Timmermans, and Kristinsson 2011; 
Winkler and Bouncken 2011). We therefore include three indicators to 
represent the diversity of university staff based on categorical breakdowns 
of staff by age band, ethnicity and gender derived from the HEIDI 
database.  In each case we construct Blau indices where p is the 
proportion of staff in a category and N is the number of categories (Blau 
1977)  : 
𝐵 = 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Higher values of the Blau indices occur when staff are divided equally 
between either age, gender or ethnicity groups suggesting greater 
diversity. Second, we include four measures intended to control for the 
resource base of the HEI: an indicator of the overall size of the HEI (log 
employment), a measure which is standardly used in studies of innovation 
as a proxy for corporate resources (Jordan and O’Leary 2007); a staff-
student ratio derived from the HEIDI database; and two indicators of the 
(log) number of academic staff and number of students per programme11.  
Third, recognising that levels of programme innovation and withdrawal may 
also vary between different subject groups we also include variables 
representing the share of programmes in STEM subjects and those which 
are either single subject or major/minor combinations. Each of these 
variables was derived from the UCAS programme data.  
In addition to these time-variant controls we also include a number of time 
invariant controls intended to reflect other aspects of HEIs’ profile. We 
include a set of locational variables which will capture policy differences 
between the home nations. We also include variables which identify the 
                                               
11 In each case staff and student numbers were derived from the HEIDI database. 
The number of programmes per institution is taken from the UCAS data.  
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mission groups to which individual HEIs belong12. Here we consider three 
mission groups:  
 The Russell Group  (www.russellgroup.ac.uk) is a consortium of 
(now) 24 research intensive universities including Oxford, 
Cambridge, Imperial, Queen’s Belfast and most recently Durham 
and York; 
 The University Alliance (www.unialliance.ac.uk/member) is a group 
of 20 universities most of which were established in the post-1992 
period. The grouping includes universities such as Manchester Met, 
Coventry, Greenwich and Huddersfield.  
 The Million+ (www.millionplus.ac.uk) formerly the Campaign for 
Mainstream Universities (CMU) represents 17 universities 
established since 1992 including London South Bank, the University 
of the West of England and Abertay University.  
The remaining universities have no established mission group alliances 
and form the reference group in our analysis.  
                                               
12 ‘The mission groups ... are a product of the desire of different self-identified 
groups of universities to express policy positions that they believe will enhance the 
welfare of their own members (although invariably making their case with reference 
to the general welfare of the higher education system) and to lobby to achieve their 
implementation. (Filippakou and Tapper 2015, p. 123). 
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Estimation approach  
Our data forms a balanced panel from 2006 to 2013 and we therefore use 
panel data estimation approaches. Our dependent variables – the 
innovation and withdrawal rates – are percentages, and panel tobit models 
with lower limits are therefore appropriate. We therefore report panel tobit 
estimates with random effects designed to capture the full population 
effect. For robustness we also report panel regressions with both random 
and fixed effects, with the latter intended to capture specific institutional 
effects. In all models we include a lagged dependent variable and all 
independent variables are all lagged one year to eliminate any issues of 
reverse causality. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
The total number of undergraduate programmes on offer from UK HEIs has 
fallen steadily over the last decade peaking at over 17,500 in 2006 and 
falling below 14,500 in 2013, a fall of around 7.4 per cent relative to 2005 
(Figure 1). Around 1:5 programmes are newly introduced or withdrawn 
each year (Figure 2) with the withdrawal rate running ahead of the 
innovation rate from 2010 to 2012 (Figure 3). The largest number of 
individual programmes on offer in 2013 was from Manchester Metropolitan 
University (316) with a number of other universities offering more than two 
hundred separate programmes (Kingston, 229; Leeds, 229; Edinburgh, 
218; Manchester, 218; Central Lancs, 211 and Kent, 203). The mean 
number of programmes offered per institution was 98.9 (SD=60.6). 
Interestingly – and perhaps counter-intuitively given the focus of UK public 
support on STEM subjects – the number of STEM and non-STEM 
programmes on offer have experienced a very similar time profile over the 
last decade (Figure 4). The proportion of STEM programmes on offer has 
only increased marginally from 36.7 per cent in 2005 to 37.5 per cent by 
2013 with most of this increase coming prior to 2008. Innovation and 
withdrawal rates for each type of programme have also been similar, with 
withdrawals running ahead of innovation in most recent years (Figure 6). 
As a result there has been little change in the STEM/Non-STEM mix of 
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programmes with the number of both declining slightly in recent years. 
Models for the innovation and withdrawal rates for all programmes are 
given in Table 2. For both the innovation rate and withdrawal rate we 
present three models for robustness: a panel tobit estimator with random 
effects, a panel regression with random effects and a panel regression with 
fixed effects for each institution. All models include a lagged dependent 
variable and year dummies as well as the range of control variables 
described earlier. Hypothesis 1 suggests that where an HEI is in a stronger 
financial position this might reduce the impetus to make costly programme 
innovations or withdrawals. For all programmes we find strong support for 
both hypothesis H1a (innovation rates) and H1b (withdrawal rates) across 
each of the different model specifications (Table 2).  
Looking more specifically at STEM and non-STEM programmes suggests a 
slightly more complex picture with a stronger financial position having its 
most significant effects on reducing withdrawal rates for STEM 
programmes and – in the fixed effects models at least – on reducing the 
introduction of non-STEM programmes (Tables 3 and 4). Table 6 provides 
a summary of the key results. The implication is of a strong link between 
financial stringency and programme innovation and withdrawal: When UK 
universities are in a stronger financial position rather than encouraging 
programme innovation this has a negative effect.  Conversely, financial 
stringency drives both programme innovation and withdrawal.  
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the link between financial well-being or 
stringency and the innovation and withdrawal rates will be stronger where 
teaching income is a more important source of revenue for the institution. 
We again find strong support for this hypothesis for all programmes (Table 
2) and non-STEM programmes (Table 4). The effect on STEM programmes 
is weaker but takes the same sign. The effect of any given level of financial 
stringency on HEIs’ programme innovation will therefore vary dependent on 
the institution’s revenue profile. For example across our sample, 
universities in the Russell Group derived 26.2 per cent of their income from 
teaching compared to an average of 38.0 per cent for all other universities. 
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The implication being that financial stringency will have a stronger impact 
on both innovation and withdrawal rates in non-Russell Group universities. 
Reflecting other evidence that internationalisation can be a spur to 
innovation (Boso et al. 2013; Chen 2012; Golovko and Valentini 2011; 
Roper and Love 2002) Hypothesis 3 suggests that internationalisation will 
have a positive stimulus on innovation and withdrawal rates. Again we find 
strong support for this hypothesis in terms of all (Table 2), STEM (Table 3) 
and non-STEM (Table 4) programmes. On average across our sample of 
universities non-EU students accounted for 13.1 per cent of accepted 
places in Russell Group universities and 4.8 per cent elsewhere suggesting 
that internationalisation will be a more important driver of programme 
innovation and withdrawal rates in Russell Group institutions 13 . It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that within both the Russell Group and 
other universities there is wide variation in the proportion of non-EU 
students14.  
Our final hypothesis, reflecting the increasing importance of third mission 
activity and university-business engagement, suggests that the greater 
university engagement with business the higher will be innovation and 
withdrawal rates. Here, we find strongly contrasting results between 
different types of university-business engagement. Contract research has 
the anticipated positive sign: greater the university’s level of contract 
research income the higher are levels of programme innovation and 
withdrawal (Table 6). However, where universities are engaged in facilities 
and equipment contracts with businesses this has a strong and 
unanticipated negative effect on programme innovation and withdrawal. 
Both business engagement effects are consistent across all programmes 
(Table 2), STEM and non-STEM programmes (Tables 3 and 4). Two 
potential – and non-exclusive - explanations are possible for the observed 
                                               
13 These figures are based on the number of places accepted by non-EU students 
through the UCAS system. They do not include places offered directly from any 
universities and may therefore under-estimate the share of non-EU students 
14 The coefficient of variation in terms of the share of accepted places by non-EU 
students for the Russell Group universities is 0.67 while that for other universities 
is 1.26. 
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negative effect of facilities and equipment contracts. First, it may be that 
these contracts act as a distraction for staff leading to lower levels of 
engagement with programme innovation and withdrawal. Another, perhaps 
more plausible, interpretation is that these contracts are a source of 
additional revenue for departments and may be reducing the pressure for 
programme innovation and withdrawal.  
While the value of facilities and equipment contracts is broadly similar 
among the Russell Group and other universities, the Russell Group 
universities have a level of contract research income from business (per 
academic employee) which is four times as high as that of other 
universities. The positive influence of university-business engagement on 
innovation and withdrawal rates is therefore likely to be much stronger for 
Russell Group universities with more uniformity to the negative effect of 
facilities and equipment contracts.  
CONCLUSIONS  
A key function of universities is the provision of under-graduate education. 
The increasing marketization of higher education requires that to remain 
attractive to potential students and faculty, HEIs have to update and 
change their portfolio of programmes. Here, we believe for the first time, we 
adopt a quantitative approach to investigate the drivers of programme 
innovation and withdrawal in the university sector. Five key empirical 
results follow which prove broadly consistent across the STEM and non-
STEM subject areas. First, financial stringency stimulates both programme 
innovation and withdrawal. That is, universities which are facing greater 
financial pressures are more likely to introduce new programmes and drop 
programmes from their undergraduate portfolio. Second, this financial 
stringency effect is stronger where universities are more dependent on 
teaching income. Third, internationalisation – and therefore a need to 
appeal to international students – is a spur to both programme innovation 
and withdrawal. Fourth, business engagement through contract research 
increases programme innovation while engagement through facilities and 
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equipment contracts has the opposite effect. 
Over the period covered by our estimation (2007-13) the number of study 
programmes on offer to undergraduates in the UK fell markedly (Figure 2). 
This is consistent with an increasingly difficult funding climate for higher 
education and the consequent rationalisation of programmes which has 
seen higher withdrawal than innovation rates (Figure 3). Two factors seem 
likely to have offset this general trend – internationalisation and the 
development of greater third mission activity through contract research for 
businesses. An exacerbating factor has been an increase in the importance 
of facilities and equipment contracts. 
The strength of these effects is likely to be uneven across the UK university 
sector. Financial effects prove more important where teaching represents a 
greater proportion of an institution’s revenue – a characteristic of less 
research intensive universities (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). Conversely, 
internationalisation and business engagement (through research contracts) 
are likely to be more important drivers of programme innovation and 
withdrawal in more strongly internationalised and research oriented 
universities. The implication is that the key drivers of programme innovation 
and withdrawal are likely to differ between institutions in a rather 
predictable pattern. 
At a systemic level our results suggest that trends towards 
internationalisation and greater business engagement are having a 
significant influence on the nature of the undergraduate programmes on 
offer in the UK. These effects therefore go beyond the well-recognised 
impacts on the content or delivery modes of particular programmes to 
influence the subject focus of the programmes themselves (Brennan et al. 
2014). The implication is that both the globalisation of under-graduate 
higher education and the increasing importance of third mission activity are 
re-shaping the UK university sector with a particularly strong impact on the 
more research intensive universities. This creates potentially conflicting 
pressures on HEIs’ programme offerings and raises potentially significant 
structural issues. In terms of globalisation, HEIs’ reshaping of their 
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programme portfolios increases their exposure to the uncertainty 
associated with international student demand. In terms of business 
engagement, a move towards more ‘business friendly’ programmes would 
be welcomed by many but may raise pedagogic issues related to the depth 
of disciplinary training.  
At a strategic level our study emphasises the complexity of influences 
which shape university agendas (Jarzabkowski 2005). Changes in under-
graduate programmes are influenced by internal resource availability and 
the priority given to teaching by each institution. They are also importantly 
influenced by other elements of the higher education innovation eco-
system (Brennan et al. 2014), through links to international markets and 
businesses. The latter link in particular emphasises the value of adopting a 
systemic approach to HEI innovation, and the legacy effects of activities 
such as collaborative research with businesses and facilities and 
equipment contracts (Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti 2015). This 
emphasises the importance of the governance arrangements covering 
such interactions and institutions’ ability to capture the potential learning 
from such relationships for subsequent programme development (Geuna 
and Muscio 2009; Young et al. 2008).  
Our study is subject to a number of limitations, some of which suggest 
interesting avenues for further research. First, our study is limited to the UK 
and inevitably therefore reflects national policy and institutional 
specificities. International replication has obvious potential. Second, our 
study is confined to under-graduate programmes while arguably the area of 
most innovative activity in the HE sector in recent years has been at the 
post-graduate level. Extending the type of analysis conducted here to look 
at the influences on innovation in specialist masters programmes would be 
a valuable next step but, for the UK at least, would be complex 
operationally due to the lack of any co-ordinated student application 
system. Finally, at present the range of innovation and programme 
withdrawal indicators we use is relatively limited and does not reflect the 
revenue impact of programme changes on each institution. Extending the 
existing study to explore the revenue implications of programme innovation 
  
 
24 
and withdrawal is an obvious next step reflecting standard measures of the 
impact of innovation on business revenues and the entire innovation value 
chain in higher education (Roper and Arvanitis 2012; Hansen and 
Birkinshaw 2007; Ganotakis and Love 2012). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework  
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Figure 2: Total number of programmes offered by UK HEIs 
 Source: UCAS, Authors’ analysis  
Figure 3: Number of new and withdrawn programmes by HEIs 
 Source: UCAS, Authors’ analysis  
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Figure 4: Innovation and withdrawal rates (%) 
 Source: UCAS, Authors’ analysis  
Figure 5: Provision of STEM and non-STEM programmes 
 Source: UCAS, Authors’ analysis  
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Figure 6: Innovation and Withdrawal rates: STEM and non-STEM 
programmes 
A. Innovation and Withdrawal rates – STEM programmes 
  
B. Innovation and Withdrawal rates – Non-STEM programmes  
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Table 1: Panel data descriptives 
Variable  
Number of 
observations Mean Std. Dev 
Innovation rate (%) 1028 18.820 13.237 
Withdrawal rate (%) 1028 20.160 11.219 
Asset to liability ratio  984 1.780 1.232 
Teaching (% of income) 984 38.796 14.295 
Non-EU students (%) 874 6.512 7.617 
Business research contract income  
(£000) 967 1.620 4.338 
F&E contracts revenue (£000) 967 0.501 1.314 
 
   Control variables 
   University size (employment, log) 990 6.633 1.090 
Staff-student ratio (log) 987 2.846 0.305 
Russell Group university  1028 0.163 0.370 
University Alliance member  1028 0.136 0.343 
Million+ member  1028 0.116 0.320 
English university 1028 0.804 0.398 
Scottish university  1028 0.115 0.319 
Northern Ireland university   1028 0.020 0.142 
Faculty per programme (log) 1007 2.314 0.726 
Students per programme (log) 1007 4.429 0.688 
 STEM subject programmes (%)  1000 35.380 17.227 
Single subject programmes (%) 938 53.535 12.685 
Major-minor programmes (%) 938 11.827 9.632 
Age diversity of staff 990 0.878 0.007 
Gender diversity of staff 990 0.489 0.013 
Ethnic diversity of staff 990 0.167 0.109 
 
Notes and sources: See text for variable definitions and sources of individual 
variables. Sources: UCAS, HE-BCI Survey, HESA HEIDI database. 
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Table 2: Modelling innovation and withdrawal rates for all programmes 
 
Innovation Rate  Withdrawal Rate 
  
Panel Tobit 
RE 
Panel OLS 
RE 
Panel 
OLS FE 
Panel Tobit 
RE 
Panel OLS 
RE 
Panel OLS 
FE 
Innovation rate (-1) -0.035 0.019 -0.114***   
               (0.030) (0.027) (0.035)   
  Withdrawal rate (-1)   
 
  0.055 0.114*** -0.074** 
             
 
  (0.038) (0.030) (0.036) 
Asset to liability ratio -2.346 -1.812 -4.112** -3.230*** -2.866** -2.815** 
             (1.524) (1.478) (1.640) (1.211) (1.186) (1.413) 
Teaching (%) -0.065 -0.043 -0.077 -0.181** -0.168** -0.145 
             (0.103) (0.091) (0.159) (0.079) (0.073) (0.137) 
Teaching x A. to  ratio 0.037 0.027 0.075* 0.056* 0.048 0.069* 
            (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) 
Non-EU students (%) 0.099 0.032 0.324** -0.112 -0.102 -0.038 
         (0.100) (0.084) (0.146) (0.074) (0.067) (0.125) 
Business research contracts    0.872*** 0.760*** 1.175*** 0.698*** 0.613*** 1.152*** 
 
(0.278) (0.238) (0.448) (0.215) (0.192) (0.376) 
F&E contract income -0.994** -0.860** -3.008*** -1.464*** -1.287*** -2.842*** 
           (0.498) (0.414) (0.857) (0.384) (0.335) (0.735) 
University size (employment, 
log) -0.312 -0.217 -39.213*** 1.689** 1.285** 5.024 
           (1.014) (0.796) (6.142) (0.746) (0.642) (5.339) 
Staff-student ratio (log) -8.326*** -7.058*** -5.44 -2.777 -2.804 -0.747 
            (2.947) (2.624) (3.881) (2.227) (2.083) (3.285) 
Russell Group university -5.702*** -4.425***   -4.680*** -4.237*** 
          (2.009) (1.537)   (1.474) (1.248) 
 University Alliance member -1.714 -1.418   -0.441 -0.174 
           (1.674) (1.294)   (1.232) (1.042) 
 Million+ member  2.538 2.282*   2.387* 2.253** 
           (1.698) (1.316)   (1.253) (1.063) 
 England -5.058** -4.045**   -0.927 -0.853 
          (2.338) (1.823)   (1.713) (1.467) 
 Scotland -6.291** -4.871**   -1.546 -1.301 
          (2.741) (2.122)   (2.006) (1.712) 
 Northern Ireland -9.749** -6.336*   -2.06 -0.78 
          (4.251) (3.235)   (3.084) (2.602) 
 Faculty per programme (log) -4.152* -3.002 44.608*** -3.070* -2.602* -10.106 
          (2.304) (1.915) (7.599) (1.687) (1.500) (6.565) 
Students per programme (log) 1.966 -1.261 1.87 -6.842*** -6.546*** -2.784 
           (2.903) (2.259) (6.660) (2.025) (1.813) (5.774) 
SEM programmes (%) -0.089** -0.084** -0.043 -0.071** -0.061** -0.07 
            (0.043) (0.034) (0.132) (0.032) (0.028) (0.114) 
Single subject programmes (%) -0.045 -0.042 -0.258** -0.083** -0.080** -0.191* 
          (0.050) (0.041) (0.117) (0.038) (0.033) (0.101) 
Major-minor programmes (%) 0.099* 0.097** 0.03 0.154*** 0.121*** 0.454*** 
           (0.054) (0.045) (0.091) (0.043) (0.037) (0.079) 
Age diversity index  46.138 36.057 -129.574 29.525 25.782 67.565 
          (78.903) (67.290) (123.888) (60.339) (54.249) (106.592) 
Gender diversity index -162.595*** -145.769*** -224.184* -92.971** -86.941** -93.713 
         (53.331) (43.180) (124.057) (39.851) (34.779) (106.585) 
Ethnic diversity index 0.822 1.557 -28.451 9.165* 9.142** -45.004** 
           (6.406) (5.047) (24.967) (4.729) (4.059) (21.547) 
N          833 833 833 833 833 833 
chi2       159.011 205.383 
 
287.468 355.694 
 bic        6426.49 . 6039.733 6087.329 . 5794.339 
Notes and Sources: See text for variable definitions and sources. Marginal effects are 
reported. All models include year dummies. * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Innovation and withdrawal rates for STEM programmes 
  Innovation Rate  Withdrawal Rate 
  
Panel 
Tobit RE 
Panel 
OLS RE 
Panel OLS 
FE 
Panel 
Tobit RE 
Panel 
OLS RE 
Panel OLS 
FE 
Innovation rate (-1) -0.018 -0.023* -0.071***   
            (0.014) (0.013) (0.025)   
  Withdrawal rate (-1)   
 
  0.016 0.057* -0.129*** 
           
 
  (0.045) (0.034) (0.040) 
Asset to liability ratio -4.09 -3.036 -0.701 -3.773* -3.341* -4.129* 
            (2.570) (2.473) (2.708) (1.965) (1.825) (2.282) 
Teaching (%) -0.115 -0.074 0.157 -0.199* -0.177* -0.158 
         (0.153) (0.153) (0.232) (0.116) (0.104) (0.196) 
Teaching x A. to  ratio 0.086 0.062 0.037 0.086* 0.075 0.089 
         (0.065) (0.062) (0.066) (0.050) (0.046) (0.056) 
Non-EU students (%) 0.069 0.099 0.134 -0.092 -0.073 -0.124 
            (0.139) (0.141) (0.208) (0.105) (0.093) (0.175) 
Business research contracts 0.793** 0.794** 0.89 0.602** 0.535** 0.929* 
          (0.390) (0.397) (0.707) (0.297) (0.262) (0.524) 
F&E contract income -0.424 -0.435 -3.596*** -1.405*** -1.279*** -3.008*** 
          (0.680) (0.710) (1.251) (0.526) (0.456) (1.022) 
University size (employment, log) -0.066 -2.201 -62.758*** 3.300*** 1.604* 11.223 
          (1.391) (1.437) (8.853) (1.062) (0.889) (7.507) 
Staff-student ratio (log) -11.675*** -12.314*** -15.233** -0.48 -0.486 2.067 
          (4.392) (4.332) (6.018) (3.164) (2.867) (4.620) 
Russell Group university -5.375** -5.553**   -4.945** -4.216** 
           (2.641) (2.814)   (2.014) (1.707) 
 University Alliance member -4.024* -3.354   -4.603*** -3.764*** 
            (2.207) (2.382)   (1.695) (1.431) 
 Million+ member  2.581 2.385   1.663 1.304 
           (2.262) (2.440)   (1.711) (1.464) 
 England -5.644* -5.707*   1.672 1.963 
         (3.109) (3.311)   (2.333) (2.009) 
 Scotland -8.017** -8.018**   -2.073 -1.552 
          (3.610) (3.871)   (2.747) (2.349) 
 Northern Ireland -15.066*** -14.935**   -1.717 -0.364 
            (5.712) (5.944)   (4.235) (3.577) 
 Faculty per programme (log) -6.950** -4.345 66.543*** -5.261** -2.803 -16.440* 
          (3.262) (3.343) (11.039) (2.378) (2.061) (9.294) 
Students per programme (log) 3.716 5.347 0.844 -7.384*** -7.465*** 5.834 
           (4.043) (3.913) (9.627) (2.838) (2.488) (8.120) 
SEM programmes (%) -0.108* -0.174*** -1.308*** 0.091** 0.037 0.697*** 
         (0.061) (0.062) (0.191) (0.045) (0.038) (0.163) 
Single subject programmes (%) -0.117 -0.111 -0.676*** -0.065 -0.041 -0.233 
           (0.071) (0.073) (0.172) (0.054) (0.046) (0.144) 
Major-minor programmes (%) 0.092 0.098 0.023 0.011 0.017 0.119 
        (0.077) (0.080) (0.135) (0.059) (0.051) (0.114) 
Age diversity index -2.125 3.355 -119.381 85.096 73.796 59.165 
          (110.496) (113.813) (178.847) (84.736) (74.819) (150.353) 
Gender diversity index -112.974 -96.696 -96.144 -57.564 -39.426 -119.369 
          (74.561) (78.246) (188.427) (57.078) (49.007) (156.479) 
Ethnic diversity index -1.137 -0.621 -63.538* 6.821 6.981 -23.689 
           (8.703) (9.271) (35.967) (6.561) (5.625) (30.285) 
N        819 819 819 819 819 819 
chi2     105.92 104.499 
 
143.762 153.258 
 bic      6693.366 . 6519.484 6311.104 . 6239.423 
Notes and Sources: See text for variable definitions and sources. Marginal effects 
are reported. All models include year dummies. * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05 and 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Innovation and withdrawal rates for Non-STEM programmes 
  Innovation Rate  Withdrawal Rate 
  
Panel Tobit 
RE 
Panel OLS 
RE 
Panel OLS 
FE 
Panel Tobit 
RE 
Panel OLS 
RE 
Panel OLS 
FE 
Innovation rate (-1) --0.096** -0.001 -0.181***   
              (0.038) (0.033) (0.036)   
  Withdrawal rate (-1)   
 
  0.051 0.120*** -0.044 
              
 
  (0.038) (0.032) (0.037) 
Asset to liability ratio -3.103* -2.375 -5.522*** -4.035*** -3.794*** -2.617 
           (1.804) (1.728) (1.921) (1.433) (1.397) (1.639) 
Teaching (%) -0.105 -0.063 -0.175 -0.237** -0.227*** -0.171 
           (0.123) (0.106) (0.187) (0.095) (0.086) (0.159) 
Teaching x A. to  ratio 0.049 0.037 0.098** 0.070* 0.066* 0.062 
         (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.037) (0.036) (0.041) 
Non-EU students (%) 0.122 0.05 0.449*** -0.125 -0.106 -0.032 
           (0.119) (0.098) (0.171) (0.090) (0.079) (0.145) 
Business research contracts 0.963*** 0.921*** 0.864* 0.929*** 0.824*** 1.152*** 
           (0.333) (0.279) (0.514) (0.260) (0.227) (0.439) 
F&E contract income -1.286** -1.067** -3.224*** -1.899*** -1.726*** -2.550*** 
           (0.601) (0.485) (0.998) (0.462) (0.396) (0.854) 
University size (employment, log) -0.321 -0.346 -34.170*** 1.403 0.924 8.842 
           (1.227) (0.932) (7.208) (0.907) (0.756) (6.176) 
Staff-student ratio (log) -8.624** -7.959*** -1.289 -4.033 -3.909 -2.323 
            (3.437) (3.045) (4.493) (2.669) (2.456) (3.815) 
Russell Group university -6.948*** -5.341***   -5.127*** -4.653*** 
            (2.435) (1.804)   (1.797) (1.471) 
 University Alliance member -0.258 0.212   2.223 2.249* 
         (2.031) (1.515)   (1.508) (1.229) 
 Million+ member  2.952 2.682*   3.651** 3.315*** 
            (2.058) (1.542)   (1.539) (1.254) 
 England -5.708** -4.904**   -2.748 -2.795 
           (2.811) (2.134)   (2.096) (1.733) 
 Scotland -4.866 -3.58   -2.203 -2.168 
          (3.302) (2.484)   (2.451) (2.018) 
 Northern Ireland -9.692* -6.117   -2.607 -1.03 
           (5.110) (3.783)   (3.768) (3.064) 
 Faculty per programme (log) -4.095 -3.002 44.323*** -2.295 -2.005 -12.661* 
            (2.711) (2.211) (8.896) (2.037) (1.770) (7.611) 
Students per programme (log) 2.141 -0.707 1.758 -7.839*** -6.882*** -5.305 
        (3.337) (2.637) (7.820) (2.462) (2.136) (6.690) 
SEM programmes (%) -0.05 -0.062 0.522*** -0.088** -0.066** -0.487*** 
      (0.053) (0.041) (0.156) (0.040) (0.033) (0.133) 
Single subject programmes (%) -0.058 -0.069 -0.155 -0.109** -0.110*** -0.103 
           (0.061) (0.048) (0.137) (0.046) (0.039) (0.117) 
Major-minor programmes (%) 0.149** 0.133** 0.173 0.203*** 0.156*** 0.526*** 
         (0.065) (0.053) (0.107) (0.052) (0.043) (0.091) 
Age diversity index 21.083 -0.073 -203.447 -26.784 -35.703 81.323 
           (94.667) (78.883) (145.450) (72.922) (63.970) (123.723) 
Gender diversity index -189.771*** -160.808*** -161.706 -124.571** -119.828*** -105.424 
            (64.542) (50.729) (145.219) (48.448) (41.032) (123.698) 
Ethnic diversity index -0.187 1.388 -42.946 9.908* 10.253** -52.684** 
           (7.747) (5.896) (29.300) (5.772) (4.782) (25.004) 
N         832 832 832 832 832 832 
chi2      116.885 151.53 
 
256.042 329.705 
 bic       6642.09 . 6298.516 6336.379 . 6034.332 
Notes and Sources: See text for variable definitions and sources. Marginal effects are reported. All 
models include year dummies. * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Symbolic summary of key results 
Hypothesis  Anticipated 
Sign 
All 
Programmes 
STEM 
Programmes 
Non-STEM 
Programmes 
Innovation rates     
H1a: Finance - - (-) - 
H2a: Teaching share + + (+) + 
H3a: Internationalisation + + (+) + 
H4a: Business 
engagement: contract 
research/consultancy 
+ + (+) + 
H4a: Business 
engagement: F&E 
contracts 
+ - - - 
Withdrawal rates     
H1b: Finance - - - (-) 
H2b: Teaching share + + (+) (+) 
H3b: Internationalisation + (-) (+) (-) 
H4a: Business 
engagement: contract 
research/consultancy 
+ + + + 
H4a: Business 
engagement: F&E 
contracts 
+ - - - 
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